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Following Regulation No. 1/2003 EC which permits the substitution of decentralised and 
private enforcement for centralised and public enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC, the 
European Commission in December 2005 presented a Green Paper on “damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules”. The purpose of this initiative is to foster private tort suits by 
victims of anti-competitive behaviour. However, there are limits to the private enforcement of 
antitrust  law  through  actions  for  damages,  since  the  harm  is  typically  shifted  to  a  large 
number of final victims who are badly informed or face a rational disincentive to sue for 
damages. 
 
Our paper focuses on a so far neglected aspect of loss diffusion which results from hardcore 
price cartels. Under reasonable conditions the owners of production factors are also affected 





Up to the present, violations of Articles 81 (prohibition of cartels) and 82 EC (prohibition of 
abuse of dominant position) have been almost exclusively dealt with by public enforcement 
by the relevant competition authorities, i.e. the European Commission and (since 2004) the 
national  competition  authorities  of  the  Member  States.  These  competition  authorities 
investigate – on their own initiative or responding to private complaints – suspicious business 
practices, in order to sanction past infringements of European competition rules and to deter 
future anti-competitive behaviour.  
 
Already  in  1974  the  European  Court  of  Justice  (ECJ)  ruled  that  Articles  81  and  82  EC 
produce direct effects in relationships between individuals, thereby creating rights directly in 
respect to the individuals concerned, which have to be safeguarded by the national courts.
1 
However, it was only in the Courage judgement of 2001 that the ECJ held that Community 
law  also  provides  for  the  possibility  of  actions  for  damages  in  antitrust  cases:  “The  full 
effectiveness of Article …[81] of the Treaty and, in particular, the practical effect of the 
prohibition laid down in Article …[85](1) would be put at risk if it were not open to any 
individual to claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct liable to 
restrict or distort competition.”
2 
 
                                                
* Prospective presenter and corresponding author. University of Hamburg, Faculty of Law, Institute of Law and 
Economics, Rothenbaumchaussee 36, 20148 Hamburg. Email address: Thomas.eger@uni-hamburg.de 
** We wish to thank Jürgen Backhaus, Sönke Häseler, Benjamin Knorr, Katerina Mountricha, Hans-Bernd 
Schäfer, Dieter Schmidtchen, Urs Schweizer and Katherine Walker for valuable comments on the first draft of 
this paper. 
1 Case 127/73, BRT v SABAM, January 30, 1974. 
2 Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan, March 22, 2001, para. 26.  
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Regulation 1/2003, which came into force on May 1, 2004, replaced Regulation 17/1962 and 
introduced a change of paradigm in the enforcement of European competition rules. The old 
centralised notification and authorisation system was replaced by a system of legal exception 
with increased importance of decentralised enforcement by national competition authorities 
and national courts
3. Also, the role of national courts to protect the subjective rights under 
Community law, for example “by awarding damages to the victims of infringements” (recital 
7),  was  explicitly  mentioned.  However,  the  determination  of  appropriate  remedies  and 
procedures  for claiming  damages  still  lies  within  the competence  of  each  Member  State. 
Therefore only the requirements of equivalence (the rules are not less favourable than those 
governing  similar  domestic  actions)  and  effectiveness  (the  rules  do  not  render  practically 




Compared to the US, where about 90% of all antitrust cases are private actions (Wils 2003, 
pp.  476;  Salop/White  1986,  pp.  1001),  private enforcement  of  European  antitrust  law  by 
damages claims for infringement is still underdeveloped in the 25 Member States.
5 For this 
reason, the European Commission presented in December 2005 a Green Paper on “Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules”, in order to “identify the main obstacles to a more 
efficient system of damages claims and to set out different options for further reflections and 
possible action to improve damages actions” (p. 4). 
 
In  the  following,  we  briefly  present  the  main  issues  of  the  Green  Paper  (chapter  II). 
Thereafter, we discuss some potential advantages and disadvantages of private and public 
enforcement of antitrust law (chapter III). In chapter IV we focus on the question of who are 
the typical victims of hardcore price cartels. Finally, we conclude our paper with a somewhat 




II. The Green Paper on “Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules” 
 
In the Green Paper the European Commission presents several options to facilitate damages 
actions for the infringement of antitrust law in the European Member States. Removing the 
obstacles  to  these  kinds  of  damages  actions  should  serve  a  double  purpose,  “namely  to 
compensate those who suffered a loss as a consequence of anti-competitive behaviour and to 
ensure  the  full  effectiveness  of  the  antitrust  rules  of  the  Treaty  by  discouraging  anti-
competitive  behaviour,  thus  contributing  significantly  to  the  maintenance  of  effective 
competition  in  the  Community  […]  (deterrence).  By  being  able  effectively  to  bring  a 
damages claim, individual firms or consumers in Europe are brought closer to competition 
rules and will be more actively involved in enforcement of the rules” (p. 4). 
 
Thereafter, the Green Paper identifies the main obstacles to private enforcement by damages 
claims and presents several options for improving the conditions for antitrust damages claims. 
In this context, the following main issues are discussed: 
                                                
3 For details see Van den Bergh/Camesasca, 2006, pp. 333. In 2005, the German Law against Restraints of 
Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, GWB) was amended accordingly; see Wurmnest 2005. 
See also Buxbaum (2005, 114 ff.). 
4 Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan, March 22, 2001, para. 29, with reference to the Palmisani 
judgement from 1997.  
5 In private litigation, the EC antitrust rules have been almost exclusively invoked as a defence (or “shield”), 
especially in contract disputes. But Articles 81 and 82 EC have rarely been used proactively (as a “sword”) to 
initiate private actions for damages or injunctive relief (Wils 2003, p. 473). 
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1.  Access  to  evidence,  i.e.  whether  there  should  be  special  rules  on  disclosure  of 
documentary  evidence  and  whether  the  claimant’s  burden  of  proof  should  be 
alleviated. 
2.  Fault requirements, i.e. whether or not fault should be presumed if an action is illegal 
under competition law. 
3.  Damages, i.e. how damages should be defined and which method should be used for 
calculating the amount of damages. 
4.  The passing-on defence and indirect  purchasers’ standing, i.e. whether or  not the 
infringer should be allowed to raise a passing-on defence if the direct purchaser passes 
losses on to indirect purchasers further down the supply chain, and whether indirect 
purchasers should be allowed to claim damages. 
5.  Defending consumer interests, i.e. whether the interests of consumers and those of 
purchasers with small claims could be better protected by collective action. 
6.  Costs of actions, i.e. how cost rules can facilitate access to courts for civil claims. 
7.  Coordination of public and private enforcement, i.e. especially how to avoid that the 
operation of leniency programs is undermined by private damages actions. 
8.  Jurisdiction and applicable law, i.e. whether a clarifying special rule on applicable 
law in antitrust damages actions is necessary. 
9.  Other issues, i.e. whether experts should be used in courts, limitation periods should 





III. Private versus public enforcement of antitrust law 
 
1. From  a general point of view, private enforcement is based on a decentralised  use  of 
information. Private parties reveal their information in order to receive compensation for the 
harm suffered (private motive). Their social function is to provide incentives for prevention 
by inducing potential injurers to internalise the harm they cause to others. For this reason, 
private enforcement has some appeal to economists, since civil court proceedings to some 
extent mimic the market mechanism. However, as Shavell (1982) put it, there is a systematic 
difference between social and private incentives to bring suit, this difference depending on the 
characteristics of the harm and on the procedural rules governing damages actions. 
 
Public enforcement may be more efficient if mainly aggregate expert information is required 
and if the social harm is spread among a multitude of victims – provided that the public agents 
are motivated to increase social welfare and that they are not captured by the companies they 
have  to  regulate.  However,  public  enforcement  typically  does  not  provide  for  the 
compensation of victims. 
 
2. In antitrust cases there may be more arguments for public enforcement than in other areas.
6 
On the one hand, there are good reasons to assume that private enforcement will work poorly 
in antitrust cases: 
 
                                                
6 See e.g. Wils (2003), Diemer (2006), Van den Bergh/Camesasca (2006, pp. 324). However, see the harsh 
criticism of Wils by Jones (2004). The most comprehensive study on private enforcement in the US was 
provided by the Georgetown Private Antitrust Litigation Project. See e. g.  Salop/White (1986) and 
Kauper/Snyder (1986). For the mixed experience with private enforcement in the US see Ginsburg (2005). 
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•  If victims of antitrust law infringements are private consumers, harm and causation are 
typically not obvious to the victims.
7 That is especially true in the case of hardcore 
price cartels, as we will show in the following chapter. The detection of infringements 
requires investigation by experts, and public authorities are often better informed than 
the victims. 
•  In these cases, the typical damages claim will be a follow-on action, i.e. the civil 
action  is  brought  after  a  competition  authority  has  discovered  an  infringement. 
Consequently, the same deterrence effect could be achieved at lower administrative 
cost by increasing the fine for infringements of antitrust law. 
•  Because the total harm caused by infringements of competition law is often spread 
across  many  victims,  even  well-informed  victims  have  little  incentive  to  bring 
damages claims. 
•  If  victims  of  antitrust  law  infringements are  commercial  parties  they  are  typically 
better informed than the competition authorities. However, even in theses cases those 
victims who are parties to a contract with the infringer will often face weak incentives 
to bring action, because they are interested in continuing the business relationship in 
the future. 
•  Facilitating  access  to  civil  courts  in  antitrust  cases  increases  the  risk  that  private 
damages actions will be abused by competitors.
8 
 
On the other hand, there is little evidence that competition authorities are captured by the 
infringers of antitrust law. The risk of regulatory capture seems at least to be considerably 
lower for competition authorities than for the (branch-oriented) regulators of public utilities. 
Of course, there are three possible sources of prosecutorial biases (Wils 2004): confirmation 
bias, i.e. competition authorities may be inclined to look only for confirmation rather than for 
challenges; hindsight bias, i.e. competition authorities may want to justify past activities; and 
the  desire  to  progress  in  career,  i.e.  having  a  record  in  detecting  hardcore  cartels  may 
positively affect agents’ future salaries and career paths. But for the reasons mentioned above, 
in  order  to  counteract  theses  biases  it  is  better  to  establish  appropriate  administrative 
proceedings, rather than to facilitate private damages claims. 
 
In  the  following,  we  will  exemplify  some  of  the  problems  of  private  enforcement  by 




IV.  Harm  produced  by  hardcore  price  cartels:  some  critical  remarks  on  the  recent 
discussion 
 
1. Harm in antitrust cases 
 
To facilitate private enforcement of antitrust law anybody who is affected by infringements of 
antitrust rules should be entitled to sue for damages. This implies that the existing limitations 
on standing for bringing such an action must be removed (Ashurst 2004, pp. 9, 38). Let us 
look at the German example of private actions in antitrust cases (Wurmnest 2005, 1179 ff.). 
Prior to the reform of the GWB in 2005, German law restricted standing for bringing an 
action for damages in cases of infringements of European or German antitrust law to those 
                                                
7 See also the interesting contribution by Hellwig (2006). 
8 Competitors should be induced by law to sue for the right reason – “that is, because a practice is harmful to 
competition, not simply because it harms the competitor” (Ginsburg 2005, p. 430). 
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claimants who fell within the scope of protection of the infringed antitrust rule (the so-called 
Schutzgesetzprinzip  or  protective  purpose  requirement).  According  to  the  new  GWB  any 
affected  party  may  sue  for  damages  in  cases  where  the  infringer  acted  intentionally  or 
negligently. Thus, in order to bring German antitrust law in line with EC Regulation 1/2003 
the German lawmaker shifted the entitlement to bring damages actions from protected to 
affected parties. But who is really affected by infringements of antitrust law? 
 
According to the difference method harm is defined as the difference between the situation 
after the occurrence of the harmful event and the hypothetical situation which would have 
existed without it. Consequently, in antitrust damages cases the measure of harm “is taken to 
be the difference between […]  the  plaintiff’s actual position […] and […] the plaintiff’s 
position in the hypothetical scenario where the illegal act has not occurred but conditions are 
otherwise similar” (Ashurst 2004, p. 10). This measure of harm raises a number of questions: 
Since competition can be characterised as a “process of creative destruction” (Schumpeter), 
all  competitive  or  anticompetitive  acts  cause  losses  to  some  rivals  or  to  some 
consumers/suppliers. Many of these losses are necessary in order to foster competition, others 
result from anticompetitive acts. Often it is difficult to clearly distinguish between the two 
types of losses and to determine whether a reduction in rivals’ profits or a loss of consumer 
surplus  caused  by  some  business  practice  should  be  considered  a  harm  which  has  to  be 
compensated. 
 
In the following, we will focus on a comparatively simple case where it is perfectly clear that 
the business practice is anticompetitive and illegal – the case of a hardcore price cartel. But 
even in this simple case the determination of harm poses some problems. We will show by 
means of a simple numerical example that the recent discussion on harm caused by price 
cartels  systematically  neglects  some  important  feedback  effects  and  produces  a  flawed 
assessment  of  the  harm  suffered  by  different  types  of  victims.  We  assume  that  the 
hypothetical situation without a  cartel  is characterised  by oligopolistic competition of the 
Bertrand type, so that the equilibrium price equals marginal cost. 
 
 
2. Consumers as the only victims of price cartels: the traditional point of view 
 
Let us consider a price cartel. In the following we discuss our case by means of a concrete 
example,  in  order  to  be  able  to  compare  the  quantitative  effects  directly.  We  assume  a 







1 v v 2 x = , 
 
where x denotes output and v1 and v2 denote inputs or factors of production. The price cartel 
buys factors of production in a competitive market, so that factor prices are perceived as 
independent of the quantity of factors each member of the price cartel employs. The prices of 
v1 and v2 are r1 = 4 and r2 = 12. Minimising costs yields the cost function 
 
C = 8x. 
 





p + − = . 
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The marginal revenue function is then  
 
MR = –x + 12.  
 
Equating marginal revenue and marginal cost, MC = 8, we obtain the cartel price p
m = 10 
(with x
m = 4). Total revenue is 40, total costs are 32, and profit amounts to G = 8. 
 
In a competitive market firms equate marginal cost and price. Here the price of output is p
c = 
8 and the corresponding quantity amounts to x
c = 8. Total revenue, as well as total costs, equal 
64, so that profits are zero.  
 
Contrasting the price cartel with a competitive market we see that in the price cartel the 
quantity of output is lower and the price is higher, thus consumers are worse off. The harm to 
consumers is equivalent to the lost consumer surplus, which corresponds to the sum of the 
cartel’s profit and the dead weight loss. The profit results from a distribution effect between 
demand and supply side, and the deadweight loss is the social cost of the inefficiency of the 
price cartel. In our example profit amounts to G = 8 and deadweight loss to L = 4, so that the 





In this case, the negative effects of the price cartel are born solely by consumers. This is the 
traditional standpoint. To raise some critical points against this accepted view let us direct our 
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3. Victims of price cartels in case of competitive factor markets 
 
The price cartel, producing only 4 units of output, employs v1 = 2 and v2 = 2 units of the 
inputs, whereas the competitive market employs v1 = v2 = 4 units to produce 8 units of output. 
The factors of production that are not used in the cartel situation either remain unemployed or, 
if employed, exert downward pressure on the factor prices. 
 
If the factors of production remain unemployed, their income drops from 64 (v1 = v2 = 4 
multiplied with r1 = 4 and r2 = 12) to 32 (v1 = v2 = 2 multiplied with r1 = 4 and r2 = 12). Thus, 
in addition to the lost consumer surplus, the harm produced by the cartel is the lost factor 
income which amounts to 32. 
 
But in flexible factor markets dismissed production factors tend to exert downward pressure 
on the factor prices. If all the factors are fully employed at lower factor prices, the additional 
harm generated by the cartel amounts to the reduced income of all factor owners.  
 
To analyse which effect the reduction of the factor prices (generated by the price cartel) has 
on the harm incurred by the consumers and owners of production factors, let us look at a 
special case (fig. 2). Let us suppose that the prices of the factors of production drop from r1 = 
4 to r1 = 3 and from r2 = 12 to r2 = 9. This yields the cost function C = 6x.
9 The quantity of 
output in the cartelised market amounts to x
mn = 6 and is offered at the price of p
mn = 9. 
 
Total revenue is 54, the income of the factors of production is 36. The price cartel employs v1 
= 3 and v2 = 3 factors of production; v1 = 1 and v2 = 1 are not employed in the cartel, but are 
employed in other firms outside the cartel. The profit of the price cartel is equal to G = 18. It 
is  composed  of  the  profit  Gi  =  12  (due  to  the  lowering  of  the  prices  of  the  factors  of 
production) and of the profit Go = 6 (due to the higher price of the output). The deadweight 
loss amounts to 1; the lost consumer surplus is 7.  
 
Without lowering the prices of the factors of production, profit amounted to 8 and deadweight 
loss to 4. The lost consumer surplus was therefore 12. Consequently the lower factor prices 
lead to higher profit and to lower deadweight loss and lower reduction of consumer surplus. 
 
But the harm to the owners of the factors of production, which corresponds to the additional 
profit due to the lowering of the factor prices, has to be added. This harm amounts to 12.
 10 
Consequently the total harm is 19. This harm is higher than the lost consumer surplus in the 
case where factor prices are not affected (12). We see that the fall in factor prices reduces the 




                                                
9 We assume that the cartel members perceive factor prices as parameters generated by the factor markets. They 
are not aware that the factor prices would be higher in the hypothetical competitive situation. Consequently, the 
producers face a specific horizontal marginal cost curve in case of competition, and another (lower) horizontal 
marginal cost curve in case of cartelisation. The case where the cartel exerts monopsony power in the factor 
market and therefore faces an upward sloping marginal cost curve is discussed below (fig. 4 and 5). 
10 This is, of course, the result of the partial analysis which focuses only on factors employed by the cartel 
members. To calculate total harm caused by the price cartel to the owners of production factors we had to take 
two additional effects into account: (1) The reduction of employment by the cartel members tends to also reduce 
the prices of production factors employed elsewhere. (2) Since some consumers will redirect their demand to 
suppliers of close substitutes the latter will increase their demand for production factors and thereby tend to 
increase factor prices.  
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In the extreme case factor prices drop until all factors are re-employed by the cartel (fig. 3). In 
our example prices fall from r1 = 4 to r1 = 2 and from r2 = 12 to r2 =  6. The cost function 
changes to C
F = 4x (from C = 8x). The output price of the cartel is now p
m = 8 and it equals 
exactly the former price in the competitive market, p
c = 8. The quantity of output equals x
m = 
x
c = 8. Total revenue is 64. The price cartel obtains a profit of 32. The income of the owners 
of the production factors adds up to 32. As opposed to the former cases, the lost consumer 
surplus and the deadweight loss are zero.  
 
The victims of the price cartel are no longer the consumers; rather the owners of the factors of 
production suffer harm. The cartel just causes a redistribution of 32 units from the factor 
owners to the cartel members. 
 
This  extreme  case  can  only  occur  in  a  competitive  factor  market  when  price  cartels  or 
dominant firms with the same degree of monopoly power exist in all branches of the economy 
(Lerner 1934, p. 172). This is, of course, not realistic. But it is even more unrealistic to 
assume that a price cartel exists in only one industry. The actual numbers of price cartels (or 
dominant firms respectively) lies in between these two extremes. The downward pressure on 
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4. Victims of price cartels that exert monopsony power 
 
Let  us  drop  the  assumption  of  competitive  factor  markets.  In  reality  factor  markets  are 
differentiated with regard to qualities and regions. We assume, therefore, that the price cartel 
exerts monopsony power in the factor markets. In a competitive market, factor price equals 
marginal revenue product. In a monopsony market, however, factors are paid less than their 
marginal  revenue  product.  The  monopsonist  purchases  up  to  the  point  where  marginal 
expenditure equals marginal revenue product, which exceeds the factor price. If supply is very 
elastic, monopsony power is small, so that marginal expenditure and average expenditure do 
not differ by much. The factor prices are close to what they would be in a competitive market. 
If  supply  is  very  inelastic,  monopsony  power  is  high,  so  that  marginal  expenditure  and 
average expenditure differ considerably. Therefore factor prices differ significantly from what 
they would be in a competitive market.  
 
Let us assume a cartel that exerts monopoly power in the product market and monopsony 
power in the factor markets. To maximise its profit the cartel has to solve the problem 
 
max G = p(x(v1, v2)) · x(v1,v2) – r1(v1) · v1 – r2(v2) · v2. 
 
The functions ri(vi) are the factor supply curves (i = 1,2) faced by the cartel. How many 
factors are employed by the cartel at which factor price depends on the elasticity of the factor 
supply curves. First, consider comparatively inelastic supply functions, such as 
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How many factors does the monopsony employ? The profit function to be maximised now 
becomes  
 




























+ − . 
 
Since the cost-minimising combination of inputs requires v1 = v2 we get  
 
v1 = 2 and v2 = 2. 
 
Factor prices are  
 
r1 = 2 and r2 = 6. 
 






marginal cost is 
 
MC
M = 2x. 
 
Equating marginal cost and marginal revenue the cartel produces x = 4 and sells at a price of p 
= 10. This is the same quantity and the same price as in the former case of competitive factor 
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Yet, profit and factor incomes differ. Total revenue is 40, total costs are 16. Profit amounts to 
24 instead of 8, and incomes of the factors of production drop from 32 to 16. The monopsony 
purchases less at a lower price. The cartel employs two units of both factors less compared to 
a competitive product market. 
 
To attain the same employment as in the case of a competitive product market (v1 = 4, v2 = 4) 
factor prices have to fall even further. The supply curves of the factors of production have to 




















so that marginal cost is 
 
MC





Equating marginal cost and marginal revenue yields x = 8 and p = 8. Prices of the factors of 
production are r1 = 1 and r2 = 3. Profit amounts to G = 48 instead of G = 32, factor income 
amounts to 16 instead of 32 (see figure 5). We see that if the cartel additionally exerts 
monopsony power in the factor markets, the harm caused to the owners of production factors 
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Figure 5 
 
In this extreme case, the burden of the price cartel falls solely on the owners of the factors of 
production. There is no loss of consumer surplus or deadweight loss.  
 
 
5. Victims and harm 
 
We conclude that the deadweight loss is the social cost of the inefficiency of the price cartel. 
When factor prices drop the deadweight loss shrinks. In the case of full employment the 
deadweight loss is zero. Additional harm is incurred by the redistribution of income from 
owners of the factors of production to price cartels in the form of profit. We have shown that 
the more the economy is cartelised and the higher the degree of monopsony power of the 
cartel, the smaller is the harm done to consumers and the greater is the harm done to owners 
of the factors of production. This has some important implications: 
  
1. Taking into account only the harm caused to consumers underestimates the actual harm to 
society. 
2. In addition to the lost consumer surplus the harm caused to the owners of the factors of 
production has to be taken into account. 
3. Fostering private tort suits of victims of anti-competitive behaviour and identifying only 
consumers as victims is far from efficient. 
4. Since the harm caused by price cartels falls on consumers as well as on the owners of the 
factors of production, there is a large number of final victims with diverse interests, so that 
the  substitution  of  decentralised  and  private  enforcement  for  centralised  and  public 
enforcement of Article 81 seems to be highly problematic. 
5. A better way of enforcing antitrust law is via public enforcement, supported by a private 

















12 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2007,  Paper 3
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2007/iss2/art3  13 
6. Fines for infringements of antitrust law should be based on the extra profits of price cartels. 
7. The fines have to be considered as revenues of the government and could, for example, be 






We  have  shown  that  the  recent  discussion  on  private  enforcement  of  antitrust  law 
systematically neglects one important effect of price cartels – the harm caused to the owners 
of production factors. When discussing the concept of harm the proponents of facilitating 
private damages actions focus on the passing-on defence, the standing of indirect purchasers 
and  similar  issues.  However,  the  inclusion  of  harm  to  the  owners  of  production  factors 
changes the results dramatically. At least in the case of hardcore price cartels, strengthening 
the importance of private enforcement will neither be an appropriate instrument for improving 
deterrence – this can be achieved at lower cost by increasing the fines for infringements of 
antitrust law – nor is it appropriate to achieve corrective justice, since damages will be only 
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